The roles of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have become increasingly controversial in the modern world of residential mortgage finance. We describe the special features of these two companies and their roles in the mortgage markets. We then discuss the controversies that surround them and offer recommendations for improvements in public policy. JEL Classification Numbers: G21, G28
has suggested that the anomalous situation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may even pose systemic risks to the financial sector.
This article will offer a generalist's guide to the functions that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac perform in the residential mortgage financial markets and the controversies that swirl around them.
Along the way we will highlight some important --and perhaps under-appreciated --changes that are occurring in the structure of U.S. residential mortgage markets.
Some Background

What Do Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Do?
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac participate in the secondary mortgage market: Mortgage originators come to them with pools (bundles) of mortgages and either swap these assets for securities or sell them outright to one of the two companies. Under Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's "swap programs," an originator exchanges a mortgage pool for a mortgage-backed security that is issued and guaranteed by one of the two companies and that represents an interest in the same pool. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac promise the security holders that the latter will receive timely payment of interest and principal on the underlying mortgages, less an annual "guarantee fee" of about 20 basis points (0.20 percent) on the remaining principal. In essence, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are providing insurance to holders of mortgage-backed securities against default risk on the underlying mortgages and are thus bearing that risk themselves. This securitization activity illustrates one of their two core businesses: mortgage credit guarantees.
The other core business of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is their investment portfolios.
These portfolios consist largely of mortgage-backed securities that they have purchased in the open market, as well as mortgages that they purchase from originators under their "cash programs." Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac fund these assets largely by issuing debt, as the two companies are highly leveraged with total equity that is less than 4 percent of total assets. The major differences between Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are in their historical roots.
The National Housing Act of 1934 created the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) and also provided for chartering national mortgage associations as entities within the federal government. The only association ever formed was the National Mortgage Association of Washington in 1938, which eventually became the Federal National Mortgage Association -now Fannie Mae. By issuing debt and purchasing and holding FHA-insured residential mortgages from "mortgage banks," Fannie Mae was able to expand the available pool of finance to support housing and also to provide a degree of unification to mortgage markets. During this time, mortgage markets were localized for technological reasons, as well as for reasons rooted in laws that prohibited interstate banking and restricted intra-state bank branches in many states during most of the twentieth century.
In 1968, Fannie Mae was converted into a private corporation, with publicly traded shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange, although it retained a unique federal charter that is discussed further below. Apparently one major reason for the privatization was that until 1968 Fannie Mae's debt was part of the federal debt; but when Fannie Mae became a publicly traded company, that debt (which stayed with the company) was removed from the national debt total.
Fannie Mae was replaced within the federal government by the Government National Mortgage Association (which became known as "Ginnie Mae"), an agency within the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) that guarantees mortgage-backed securities that have as their underlying assets residential mortgages that are insured primarily by the FHA or by the Department of Veterans Affairs (formerly the Veterans Administration, or VA).
Freddie Mac, by contrast, was created by Congress in 1970 to support mortgage markets by securitizing mortgages originated by savings and loan associations (S&Ls). During the 1970s and 1980s, Freddie Mac was technically a private company, with its equity shares held solely by the twelve Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs) and by S&Ls that were members of the FHLBs.
Freddie Mac's board of directors consisted of the three board members of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, which regulated the S&L industry during that time. Freddie Mac was converted in 1989 into a publicly traded company, also traded on the New York Stock Exchange, with the same special features as apply to Fannie Mae. A major motivation for the conversion of Freddie Mac to a publicly traded company was the belief that a wider potential share-holding public would raise the price of the shares held by the then ailing S&L industry and thus improve the balance sheets of the latter.
In its early history, Freddie Mac tended to securitize mortgages, originated largely by S&Ls, whereas Fannie Mae tended to hold the mortgages that it bought largely from mortgage banks. By the 1990s, however, the two companies' structures and strategies looked quite similar.
Current Size
As of year-end 2003, Fannie Mae had $1,010 billion in assets and Freddie Mac had $803 billion in assets, making them the second and third largest U.S. companies, respectively, on this basis. In addition, both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had significant quantities of mortgage-backed securities outstanding -that is, net of mortgage-backed securities carried on their balance sheets.
As of year-end 2003, Fannie Mae had $1,300 billion in outstanding mortgage-backed securities while Freddie Mac had another $769 billion outstanding.
Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have grown rapidly over the past three decades and at a faster clip than the residential mortgage market as a whole. As Table 1 for fixed-rate single-family mortgages that were eligible to be purchased or securitized by the two companies (about half of the total residential mortgage market), the two companies accounted for 71 percent of that slice (through either their securitizations or their portfolio holdings).
Special Features of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac differ from other U.S. corporations in that they were created by Congress and maintain exclusive federal charters. These charters, in turn, confer a number of rights and responsibilities on these companies (U.S. Congressional Budget Office, 1996 Office, , 2001  U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1996; U.S. Government Accounting Office, 1996) .
Some of the advantages that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac enjoy are as follows. First, they are exempt from state and local income taxes. Second, the Secretary of the Treasury has the authority to purchase up to $2.25 billion of Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's securities. Third, they issue "government securities," as classified under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which in practice means that their securities are eligible for use as collateral for public deposits, for purchase by the Federal Reserve in open-market operations, and for unlimited investment by federally insured depository institutions. A further implication is that they are exempt from the registration and reporting requirements and fees of the Securities and Exchange Commission, although Fannie Mae voluntarily registered its stock with the SEC in March 2003, and they are exempt from the provisions of many state investor protection laws. Fourth, they use the Federal Reserve as their fiscal agent, which means that their securities are issued and transferred using the same system as U.S. Treasury borrowings. Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's federal charters also present some disadvantages for these companies. First, their activities are restricted to residential mortgage finance. Second, they are restricted to the secondary market, which means that they cannot originate mortgages directly.
Third, there is a maximum size of mortgage that they can finance. These mortgages are usually described as "conforming" mortgages; larger mortgages are usually described as "jumbos."
2 The size is linked to an annual index of housing prices; for 2004, the limit for a single-family home is $333,700. Fourth, the mortgages that they finance must have at least a 20 percent down payment, or else have mortgage insurance that is provided either by private firms or the federal government.
Fifth, they are subject to federal safety-and-soundness regulation, including minimum leverage and risk-based capital requirements and supervisory examinations, by the Office of Federal Housing
Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), an independent agency within the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Sixth, they are subject to "mission oversight" by HUD, which approves new housing finance programs and sets percent-of-business housing finance goals.
Currently, 50 percent of Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's business must benefit low-and moderateincome families, 31 percent must benefit underserved areas, and 20 percent must serve "special affordable" needs.
A Halo of Government Support
By law, securities of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are required to include language that they are not guaranteed by, or otherwise an obligation of, the federal government. However, Fannie
Mae's and Freddie Mac's special federal charters and the attendant package of special benefits directly lower their operating costs and have created a "halo" of implied federal government support for the two companies. In addition, past government actions have contributed to the perception of implied government support. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Fannie Mae was insolvent on a market value basis and benefited from supervisory forbearance (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2 Other non-conforming mortgages (besides jumbos) are those that do not meet the credit-quality standards of the two companies. Also, this limit applies only to a single-unit residence; higher limits apply to two-unit, three-unit, and fourunit residences and to multi-family housing. Also, limits for Hawaii, Alaska, and the Virgin Islands are, by law, 50 percent higher.
1990; Kane and Foster, 1986) . A summarizing phrase for this halo is that the two companies are "government sponsored enterprises" (GSEs). Warga, 1996, 2002; Nothaft, Pearce and Stevanovic, 2002 Passmore (2003) , and Ambrose, LaCour-Little and Sanders (forthcoming), and the references in these papers. 3 The Federal Home Loan Bank System, which serves as a wholesale bank for many federally insured depository institutions (banks, S&Ls, and credit unions), enjoys a similar package of favorable features and is similarly described as a GSE. There are also GSEs that serve agricultural credit markets (Farm Credit System and the Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation, or Farmer Mac) and the student loan market (Student Loan Marketing Association, or Sallie Mae), although the latter is in the process of privatization under the name SLM Corp. The financial pages of major newspapers often set aside a separate box of "agency issues" to report the yields on GSE securities -a visible illustration of how they are treated differently.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may bring other potential benefits to mortgage markets, although these claims are often controversial. For example, one controversy is over whether Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac enhance the stability of the mortgage market by acting as a large "market maker" in mortgage-backed securities and thereby reducing interest rate volatility in that market (Gonzalez-Rivera, 2001; Naranjo and Toevs, 2002; Peek and Wilcox, 2003) . We will discuss one counterargument to this point below -the possibility that the sheer size of these mortgage portfolios creates a potential for systemic risk in the financial system. 
Residential Mortgages: A Primer
To appreciate the central role that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac play in U.S. residential mortgage finance, a brief tutorial on mortgage finance itself will be useful, including the process of mortgage securitization.
Some Interesting Aspects of Residential Mortgages
At one level, a residential mortgage is a simple debt instrument. The purchaser of a home borrows money to finance the home purchase. The home serves as the collateral for the loan. The borrower makes monthly payments that cover the interest on the outstanding principal and the amortization of that principal.
The complexity of the mortgage as a debt instrument arises because of the interactions among three properties of most U.S. single-family residential mortgages: lengthy maturities, fixed interest rates, and "free" prepayment options. First, the term of most mortgages is for 15 or 30 years, with the average term of a new mortgage for a single-family residence hovering at about 27-28 years over the past decade. Second, fixed-rate mortgages are more common than adjustable-rate mortgages, which have been one-quarter or less of the market in the last 6-7 years and exceeded one-third of the market in only a single year during the 1990s. Indeed, adjustable rate mortgages were relatively unknown before the early 1980s, primarily because federal regulation prevented most depository institutions from originating them. Finally, these long-term, fixed-rate mortgages are generally prepayable without a penalty, in the sense that the borrower can accelerate the repayment of principal or repay the entire amount at any time, at no additional cost. Though the borrower does not pay an explicit penalty at the time of repayment, the cost of the option to the lender is incorporated into the contract interest rate and the fees that the lender charges at the time of origination.
A mortgage lender faces two kinds of risks. First, credit risk bears on whether the lender will be repaid the principal amount that has been lent and the contracted interest. Second, market risk refers to whether changes in market conditions --primarily interest rate changes -will affect the value of the mortgage. 4 More detail on the characteristics of residential mortgages can be found on the website of the Federal Housing Finance Board: <http://www.fhfb.gov>.
The credit risk on most single-family residential mortgages is quite low. 5 After all, lenders only originate such loans after screening for adequate household income and a good credit history. A fixed-rate debt instrument also creates market risk for the lender. If interest rates increase, the price of the instrument declines; and if interest rates decrease, the price of the instrument rises. The longer is the maturity of the instrument, the greater are the associated price swings. These risks are further complicated by changes in the rate of prepayment. A lower interest rate, which would benefit the lender of a fixed-rate instrument, makes borrowers more likely to repay their existing mortgages, either by refinancing the existing mortgage or deciding that the time is right to purchase a new home. This quickening of the repayment rate deprives the lender of the potential capital gain on the mortgage that would otherwise occur on a debt instrument that could not be repaid; equivalently, the greater pace of repayment is occurring just when the lender doesn't want repayment, since the lender can then only relend (or reinvest) the funds at the lower prevailing interest rates. Conversely, a higher interest rate leads to less prepayment. In this case, the capital loss that the lender would have experienced on a fixed-rate debt instrument as interest rates increase is compounded by the slackening of the prepayment rate; in essence, prepayments are slackening just when the lender wishes that they would accelerate. In the specialized literature, this phenomenon of additional adverse effects on the mortgage lender from decreases or increases in interest rates is described as the "negative convexity" of the mortgage instrument.
Mortgage Securitization
Prior to 1970, mortgages were largely a non-traded debt instrument. 6 The initial lender that originated the loan usually held the loan until it matured (or was prepayed), collecting interest and principal repayments in the interim. In 1970, Ginnie Mae issued the first "pass-through" mortgagebacked securities, which created a claim on an underlying pool of residential mortgages and meant that security-holders had the right to receive a fractional share of the interest and principal repayments of the pool as a whole. The Ginnie Mae securities carried the federal government's promise of timely payment of interest and principal, on top of the guarantees issued by the FHA and the VA on the underlying mortgages. For the first time, the claim on a stream of mortgage payments could be readily traded.
A number of aspects of mortgage-backed securities are worth noting. First, securitization greatly widens the potential market for the ultimate financing of residential mortgages. Anyone who buys the security directly or indirectly (for example, through a mutual fund or pension fund) is, in essence, providing the mortgage financing.
Second, investors in mortgage-backed securities are in a poor position to assess the credit risk as to what proportion of the individual mortgages in the underlying pool will be repaid on schedule, so they require some assurance on these credit risks. Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, and
Freddie Mac offer direct guarantees with respect to these repayment rates when they issue such securities. "Private-label" securitizations offer other kinds of reassurance: for example, private financial guarantees; "overcollateralization," in which a security issuer pledges assets to back the securitization in an amount that exceeds the face value of the securities being issued; or structuring the securities with senior and subordinated tranches, such that credit losses are first absorbed by more subordinate securities up to certain values.
Third, mortgage-backed securities holders are not protected from the market risks associated with holding long-term, fixed-rate, prepayable mortgages. The holder of a simple "pass-through" mortgage-backed security (described above) experiences the same effects of interest rate changes --including the effects of prepayments --as does the owner of an otherwise similar unsecuritized pool of mortgages.
Fourth, the securitization process creates opportunities for "slicing and dicing" the cash flows in ways that allow the risks to be better allocated among capital markets participants according to their preferences (Fabozzi, 2001) . The "senior/subordinated" structure noted above is one such method. As another example, the cash flows from a mortgage pool can be divided into a "principal-only" security and an "interest-only" security, where the former has characteristics that heighten interest-rate risks, while the latter (at least for modest changes in interest rates) ameliorates them.
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More elaborate multiple-layer securities, in which some investors have more buffering from early prepayment and others have less, can also be created from Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac pass-through securities and are described as "collateralized mortgage obligations" (CMOs) or "real estate mortgage investment conduits" (REMICs).
Trends in Residential Mortgage Finance
The structure of residential mortgage markets is substantially different today than it was in 1970. At that time, the dominant pattern was as follows: The financial institution --typically a savings and loan or a savings bank --that originated a fixed-rate mortgage loan also held it in its portfolio, and the same financial institution collected the monthly payments and dealt with delinquencies. The funding for the loan was provided by the institution's deposits, which were insured by the federal government, through the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (for S&Ls) or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (for commercial banks). As Table 2 shows, in 1970 savings and loan institutions held over 56 percent of outstanding single-family mortgages, and commercial banks and savings and loans together held over 70 percent.
By contrast, the typical pattern today is for mortgage originators to share some or all of the risks associated with fixed-rate residential mortgage loans with the secondary market. Depository Only adjustable rate mortgages or those fixed-rate mortgages that exceed the conforming loan limits ("jumbos") or that do not meet certain the underwriting criteria are likely to be held in the originator's portfolio (if the originator is a depository institution) or securitized in a "private label" offering. As Table 2 also shows, as of year-end 2000, the share of "whole loan" singlefamily mortgages held by banks and savings and loans had plummeted to below 30 percent, despite an increase in commercial banks' share of single-family mortgage mortgages between 1970-2000.
However, if one were also to include the banks' and S&Ls' holdings of mortgage-backed securities (and thus the depositories' exposure to mortgage-related market risk), their share would rise to slightly over 40 percent.
This vertically dis-integrated structure allows for greater specialization among institutions with respect to mortgage originations, collecting payments, dealing with delinquent loans, funding, liability issuance, and guarantees.
Why the Trend to Securitization and Dis-Integration of Mortgage Markets?
Technological advancements --especially improved and lower-cost data processing and telecommunications -have undergirded both the expansion of the securitization process and division of the market into many interlocking providers. Loan originators are able to gather
information about prospective borrowers, analyze it, make judgments about who to lend to, and transmit that information and those judgments to others -notably, securitizers and investors --in ways and over distances that weren't possible in the 1970s. Regulation, however, has also contributed to the expanded role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in residential mortgage markets, in at least two ways. First, since 1988, the regulatory risk-based capital (net worth) requirements that apply to banks and savings and loans have included a lower requirement of 1.6 percent for holding mortgage-backed securities issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, compared with the 4 percent requirement for holding whole (unsecuritized) residential mortgage loans. At first blush, since riskbased capital requirements for whole-loan mortgages are at the same level as the minimum "leverage" requirements for an adequately capitalized depository institution (a 4 percent ratio of a depository's overall capital to assets), there would seem to be little market impact from these riskbased capital charges. However, in cases where a depository institution holds a diversified loan portfolio that includes higher-risk loans requiring capital levels above the minimum leverage requirements, their portfolio may be bound by risk-based capital requirements. So, at the margin, the lower capital requirements for mortgage-backed securities would strongly encourage the institution to substitute mortgage-backed securities for "whole" mortgage loans. Frame and White (2004b) discuss this "regulatory capital arbitrage" in greater detail.
Second, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are required to hold at least 2.5 percent capital against mortgages (or their own mortgage-backed securities) that they retain in their portfolios.
At first glance, this would seem to put such portfolio retention at a capital cost disadvantage as compared with depositories' holdings of mortgage-backed securities (at 1.6 percent). But in comparison with depositories that are bound by the 4 percent minimum leverage requirement (such as savings and loans that tend to specialize in mortgage lending), the purchases by Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac for their own portfolios would have a capital cost advantage.
Strategic management decisions have also been an influence. When Freddie Mac became a publicly traded company in 1989 and was freed from the constraints that had previously been imposed by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, its management soon realized that its favorable borrowing rates provided an excellent opportunity to expand its income by earning a spread on the difference between mortgages that it held in portfolio and its favorable borrowing rates. Though Fannie Mae was chastened and restrained by its near-insolvency in the early 1980s, by the 1990s its management had also adopted this expansionist mentality. The motives underlying these public policy actions toward housing are diverse. One motive is to assist the middle class with a major household expenditure. Another motive is to support revenues and employment in residential construction, sales, and complementary industries. Yet another motive is that homeownership can be viewed as a way of encouraging households to save (at least so long home values do not decline, or other offsetting reductions in saving or increases in borrowing don't offset the value of home equity). But for most economists, the strongest arguments for government support of housing involve either a form of in-kind redistributions of income toward lower-income households, or the claim that homeownership has positive externalities. For example, an owner is likely to care more about a residence and the surrounding neighborhood than is an absentee landlord, which can result in positive externalities including the external appearance of property, greater watchfulness leading to greater public safety, and support for local public goods.
A modest but growing empirical literature provides some documentation for these positive externalities for neighborhoods and even positive effects on owner-occupier families themselves. (Green and White, 1997; DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999; Aaronson, 2000 ; and the references therein).
If redistribution to those with lower income or the positive externalities from a higher rate of homeownership are the goals, then the logical policy would encourage low-and moderate-income households, who may be on the margin between renting and owning, to become first-time home buyers. Such programs might aim to reduce down payments, since the size of down payment can be a binding constraint for low-income households (Linneman and Wachter, 1989; Quercia, McCarthy and Wachter, 2003) , or to reduce monthly payments. However, most housing programs are broadbased efforts that encourage more housing construction and consumption throughout the income and social spectrum. For example, the income tax benefits from home ownership operate as exemptions and deductions, which means that they tend to favor disproportionately higher-income households in higher marginal tax brackets (Rosen, 1979; Gervais, 2002) . Nevertheless, the bulk of the mortgage purchases by the two companies have not involved the groups that ought to be the target of homeownership-encouraging activities (U.S. Office of
Management and Budget, 2004). While some research has found that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
have recently increased the supply of mortgage credit available to low-and moderate-income households (Ambrose and Thibodeau, 2004) , it does not appear that the companies' activities have appreciably affected the rate of homeownership in the United States (Feldman, 2002; Painter and Redfearn, 2002; Freeman, Galster and Malega, 2003) .
Such broad-based encouragements for housing imply that most beneficiaries would have bought anyway, and the marginal effects are largely to cause them to buy larger and betterappointed homes, on larger lots, and/or to buy second homes. In turn, this broad-based encouragement means that the United States has invested in an inefficiently large housing stock, although the empirical literature that attempts to measure the magnitudes of these broad social consequences is surprisingly small. In one recent study, Gervais (2002) finds that the taxation of the implicit rents on owner-occupied housing (accompanied by a compensating adjustment in tax rates) could cause general consumption levels to increase by almost 5 percent. Taylor The implied federal guarantee of Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's financial obligations create a "moral hazard" problem. Because of the implied guarantee, creditors do not monitor the firms' activities as closely as they otherwise would. As a consequence of this reduced monitoring, the managements of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can engage in activities that involve greater risk (with greater liability consequences for the government), since the companies' owners will benefit 8 Recall that the gross benefits from the implied guarantee are simply the differential between the interest rates that the GSEs' creditors actually demand (given their belief that the federal government would be likely to bail them out) and what they would require if the two companies were wholly divorced from the federal government. 9 Though the overall mortgage market has grown at an average annual rate of 8.5 percent over the past decade, this rate could not be sustained indefinitely, nor could the two GSEs' even faster growth. Instead, we have assumed a growth rate that would be roughly equal to the growth of nominal U.S. GDP. At the other extreme, if the two GSEs' portfolios and MBS were to be frozen at year-end 2003 levels, the contingent liability would be "merely" $183 billion.
from the "upside" outcomes while being buffered (because of the limited liability of corporate owners) from the full consequences of large "downside" outcomes.
Safety-and-soundness regulatory oversight is one way to deal with insufficient market monitoring and discipline. However, in the case of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the case for such regulation must be more nuanced. The federal guarantee itself is implicit and based on expectations, rather than a legally binding obligation of the government. The presence of safetyand-soundness oversight likely reinforces such expectations, and it is thus unclear whether safetyand-soundness regulation for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac actually reduces taxpayer exposure (Frame and White, 2004a; Greenspan, 2004 
Systemic Risk
In recent testimony before Congress, Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan (2004) suggested that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may pose "systemic risks" to the U.S. economy. That is, if one of the companies became financially distressed, enough harm to the overall financial system could be caused such that a non-trivial reduction in general economic activity would result.
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Such concerns generally begin with the observations that these companies are large, highly leveraged, and focused on a particular asset class that they dominate. As noted above, as of yearend 2003, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were the second and third largest U.S. companies measured by assets. In terms of financial leverage, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac operated with ratios of total capital to total assets of 3.4 percent and 3.9 percent, respectively, as of that same date.
(By contrast, FDIC-insured depository institutions maintained a ratio of total capital to total assets A specific area of systemic concern has been the effect of portfolio rebalancing by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on fixed-income markets. For example, a decline in the general level of interest rates often leads to increased prepayment risk, which in turn reduces the duration of mortgage-related assets. Holders of these assets, if they would like to maintain the original duration of their portfolios, would then have to purchase other longer-term assets to add duration. Increased demand for these longer-term assets would increase the price of these assets, or equivalently reduce the interest rates on them further. Perli and Sack (2003) although at the time of this writing only Fannie Mae has followed through. These steps all seem headed in the right direction, although some improvements also seem possible (Frame and Wall, 2002; Jaffee, 2003) . A more direct approach to reducing systemic risk associated with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would be to limit their debt issuance, thereby capping the size of their respective balance sheets (Greenspan, 2004) . Mac. In the event of counterparty default, however, there is "rollover risk" to the extent that Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac find it difficult or particularly expensive to replace their hedging positions (Jaffee, 2003) . An introduction to derivatives and their uses and misuses in this journal can be found in Stulz (2004) .
The other argument is that, under current regulations, federally insured depository institutions can make unlimited investments in the obligations of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
However, as illustrated in Frame and Wall (2002) 
Allocative Efficiency
The benefits embedded in the federal charters of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac act as a barrier to entry in the secondary conforming mortgage market (Goodman and Passmore, 1992; Hermalin and Jaffee, 1996) . In that market, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can be characterized as duopolists. However, instead of raising prices, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac cause mortgage interest rates to be below those that the private market would otherwise provide. For this reason, Carlton, Gross and Stillman (2002) conclude that the two companies do not raise antitrust concerns.
Nevertheless, an examination of market power in the context of a government subsidy should not offer comparisons with an unsubsidized market, but instead should ask whether the subsidy is completely passed through by competing firms to customers. Some theoretical research has examined various equilibrium outcomes arising from interactions between a perfectly competitive primary mortgage market and a less than perfectly competitive secondary mortgage market (for example, Gan and Riddiough, 2004; Passmore, Sparks and Ingpen, 2002; Heuson, Passmore and Sparks, 2001; Passmore and Sparks, 2000) . Such studies examine issues related to Of course, if one believes that broad-brush public policies encourage too much housing investment and that the activities of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac exacerbate this problem, then the exercise of market power by these firms will improve allocative efficiency in the economy.
Institutions for Greater Market Efficiency
As an historical matter, Fannie (Woodward, 2004) . However, these transaction costs are actually shifted rather than eliminated:
investors believe that they are shielded from credit risk not only by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, but also ultimately by taxpayers.
Another argument is that the new-era securitization process is an inherently more efficient way of providing mortgage finance and that the expansion of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (with their implicit federal guarantee) at the expense of depositories' holdings of residential mortgages (supported by the depositories' explicit federal deposit insurance) is evidence of this superior efficiency (Van Order 2000a,b; . Three potential counterpoints come to mind here. First, securitization is a widely used technology of finance in the United States: it permeates our consumer credit markets (mortgages, credit cards, auto loans) and is used by both depository and non-depository financial institutions. Second, as discussed earlier, an important reason why depository institutions securitize mortgages with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac rather than holding them in their portfolios is the differential treatment of these assets for purposes of required regulatory risk-based capital. Finally, it is marginal debt funding costs that matter, rather than average costs. While these are probably roughly equal for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (that is, they face a perfectly elastic supply of loanable funds), banks likely face a rising marginal cost curve as they tap into non-core deposits or borrow money from wholesale lenders (like the Federal Home Loan Banks) or the capital markets. Hence, the extent to which the dramatic changes in the structure of U.S. residential mortgage markets are efficiency-driven rather than regulation-driven remains unclear.
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Finally, there is no assurance that the current organizational structures for Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac are the most efficient. Since the Congress has issued only two charters of this particular kind, no competitive processes exist to reward more efficient firms and winnow less efficient firms. The market for corporate control also cannot operate effectively, since the two companies' large sizes and special status likely make them immune to a takeover by a firm or an investor group.
What is to be done?
First-Best
There seems no strong efficiency reason for preserving the existing structure of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. They mostly just add to an already excessive encouragement for housing in the United States, using an implied guarantee that (to the extent that it would be honored)
creates a contingent liability for the U.S. government. Thus, a complete privatization of the two companies would be the first-best outcome. In this vision, the two companies would no longer enjoy any special privileges, but also would no longer be restricted to their current narrow slice 13 As a related matter, whenever either of the two firms has expanded slightly in "horizontal" (sub-prime lending) or "vertical" (providing underwriting software to mortgage originators) directions --or even publicly contemplated such moves --critics have complained that the two companies' ability to expand arises solely from the low-cost funding that they enjoy from the implicit guarantee and not because of any inherent efficiency advantage.
of the financial world. The consequence of such a step for residential mortgage markets would be modest: Mortgage rates would probably rise by about 20-25 basis points (ceteris paribus).
Because it appears that the United States already builds and consumes too much housing, this would be a move in the right direction. Instead of backing a broad subsidy to housing through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the federal government ought to focus on assisting first-time home buyers with low and moderate incomes (Calomiris, 2001; White, 2003) .
Second-Best
The complete privatization of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac seems an unlikely outcome in the current political environment. Accordingly, second-best measures should be considered.
One useful step would be for government officials to state clearly, whenever the subject Second, the enterprises should be forced to focus more on the lower end of the housing market. The loan limit for a conforming mortgage might be frozen at its current level of $333,700 for some years. HUD might strengthen the affordable housing goals that it sets for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Indeed, as of the fall 2004 HUD is fielding comments on proposed revisions to these goals that would result in a marked increase in targeted lending.
Third, the safety-and-soundness regime should be strengthened so that it is more comparable to that of the federal banking agencies. This step should include giving OFHEO or its successor: 1) responsibility for the approval of new programs and other activities; 2) the discretion to set both minimum and risk-based capital requirements; and 3) receivership authority. While the presence of a safety-and-soundness regulatory regime likely reinforces the market perception of an implied guarantee, stronger oversight should serve to reduce taxpayer exposure.
The policy issues raised by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are complex and increasingly important as these institutions grow and become a more pervasive influence on the financial sector.
Although the first-best path of privatization may well be politically unrealistic, we believe that some constructive second-best measures deserve serious consideration.
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